Modelling ethno-nationalist radicalization:

On the effectiveness of nationalist ideologies

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Introduction

- Specific objective of the talk:
  - Ethnic *conflicts.*

- End of cold war:
  - Changing agenda of security studies from *inter* to *inner* state security
  - Question: what are the ties of social integration?
  - Relation of conflict theory to workshop issue

Introduction

- Specific target of the model:
  - Ethnic conflicts in former Yugoslavia.
- Original intention (around 2011):
  - Preliminary test model.
    - Based on specific case evidence
  - To be compared with specific evidence from Northern Ireland
    - In 2011 not seen as urgent
  - Basis for identifying theoretical core model

The Yugoslavian case

- Yugoslavia: well documented

Puzzle:
- In the beginning: attempts to recruit Serbian men failed
- In the end: citizens voluntarily participated at war crimes

$\Rightarrow$ "manipulation" or "ancient hatred"?

Characteristics of the conflict escalation in former Yugoslavia:
- Constitution 1974: federation consisting of 6 nations and 2 autonomous regions
- after Tito's death: power struggle between the national oligarchs

The Yugoslavian case

Oligarchic power struggle:

- success mode of the power struggle: appeal to the value of nationalism
  - Milosevic 3 times elected
  - Tudjman life long president

- declaration of a threat of the nation
  - e.g. alleged demographic genocide

$\Rightarrow$ Breakdown of Yugoslavia

- **Macro level of political power relations does matter**

The Yugoslavian case

- Problem: Yugoslavia multinational society

- nevertheless at the beginning of 1990s local ethnic relations regarded as good in spite of political tensions

The Yugoslavian case

Consequence of Yugoslavia's breakdown:

- series of wars
- ethnic homogenisation
- $\Rightarrow$ paramilitary militia
  - to large degree: self-organised activity
  - sometimes only barely controlled by political oligarchs
- Why where people attuned to undertake such crimes, i.e. how did neighbourhood relation change?
- **Micro level of neighbourhood relations does matter**

Model design

Research question:

- How are macro (political) and micro (neighbourhood) level are related?

  $\Rightarrow$ Dynamics of political system *internal* variable of dynamics of socio-cultural system

- Difference to Schelling type models of diversity:

  $\Rightarrow$ No representation of political level

- Difference to typical models of political science:

  $\Rightarrow$ Switching between e.g. repressive politics and power sharing (Lustick et al. 2004):

  - Political level *independent* variable

Model design

General design:
- two kind of actors, acting in different context
  - politicians
  - population
- Motivation:
  - politicians: rational
  - civilians: emotional
- actions structurally coupled
  - mobilisation
  - valuation
⇒ **recursive interdependency: self-organisation**

Politicians

Mobilisation   valuation

Civilians

Model design

actor models: politicians

maximising subjectively expected utility (SEU theory)

goal of politicians:

- career advancement

politicians are in competition:

$\Rightarrow$ criterion: popularity

- political speeches: value enforcement in the population
  - nationalist
  - civil
 - modestly nationalist (respect of civil rights)

Model design

actor models: civilians

emotional motivation: two value orientations (Identity preserving man)

- Civil values *('Yugoslavism')*
- National identities *(Serb, Croat, etc.)*

$\Rightarrow$ evaluation of speeches dependent on distance

Model design

Spatial representation – case specific:
- Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia
- agent distribution according to population statistics of 1991

Model scheduling

Scheduling:

Model scheduling

- **Politicians appeal to civil values or national identity**
  - election campaigns

- **Civilians: updating political opinion: comparison with neighbourhood**
  - Success of political campaigns: they are topic of public discussions
  - Participation at demonstrations enforces value preferences (Case specific)

Model scheduling

- **Representation of political level**
- **Type of speech (next round) dependent on strategic evaluation**
  - Politicians are opportunistic: change from communism to nationalism
- **Political conflicts if speeches gain support outside of the territory – case specific**
  - Yugoslavia: federal republic
  - people of different nationality living in different republics
  - appeal to nationalism recognised by inhabitants of a republic of different national origin (e.g. Krajina Serbs)

Model scheduling

- **Representation of neighbourhood relations:**
  - **Formation of militia – case specific**
  - **Conditions**

(a) political conflicts *(Opportunities)*

(b) radical networks *(Motivation)*
  - Ethnic homogenisation undertaken not by individual offenders but groups
  - involves radicalised neighbours: sustaining national identity (emotional motivation)

(c) complicity of population *(success condition)*
  - while warned of the attack no warning of neighbours
  - participation at looting
  - **Consequences**
 - Refugees: highly radicalised, willing to join militia

Simulation results

development of citizen's value orientation:
- red: national values, blue: civil values

Bosniaks

Croats

Serbs

'Croats' and 'Serbs':
- at the beginning strong rising of national values

'Bosniaks':
- at the beginning only modest rising of national values
- later radicalisation

Simulation results

speeches of 6 most popular politicians per republic:

Bosnia: 3 Serb 1 Croat 2 Bosniak		
15 nat.	4 mod. nat.	18 civ.

Croatia: all Croat		
32 nat.	4 mod. nat.	13 civ.

Serbia: all Serb		
31 nat.	3 mod. nat.	4 civ.

relative frequency of nationalist/civil speeches

Bosnia $\approx$ 0.8
Croatia $\approx$ 2.5
Serbia $\approx$ 7.8

$\Rightarrow$ first militia of Serbian population

Conclusion

Serbia/Croatia:

$\Rightarrow$ dynamics driven by *political actors*

Bosnia:

at the end of the simulation increasing predominance of national values

- no predominance of nationalist Bosniak politicians

- Dynamics driven by the *population:* refugees

  - to be expected: increasing selection of nationalist politicians in the future

Conclusion

- **Results partly case specific - Implications for ethnocentrism and diversity:**
  - Political power relation do matter
    - Representing a constituent's ethnicity provides possible power territory
  - Multicultural societies less vulnerable for political radicalization: Macro level stability
    - Major of Sarajevo, Major of London
    - India: long time secular government
  - Multicultural societies vulnerable for neighbourhood radicalization: Micro level criticality?

Thank you for your attention